judiciary vs parliament part 2

Raja Rampal case -- cash for question
fixed the fee of signing a petition at 25000/- per mp claiming sasta roye bar bar mehnga roye ek baar

narshimha roy vs state (CBI) -- cash for vote --shibu soren and jharkhand mukti morcha during jaya lalita's rebuttal. It was the same jaya that threatened ROY government to put 69% reservation in 9th schedule threatening to remove outside support otherwise.

IN both the cases parliament vs judiciary battle happened and in both parliament emerged victorious. In the cash for question , Rampal and corrupt comrades were outrightly dismissed by the parliament w/o even a chance hearing. They took the case to supreme court claiming violation of natural justice as they were not given a chance to be heard. Judiciary intervened in this matter and said to the parliament that due process be followed.

Somnath chatterjee the then speaker told the removed members to not appeal to the court anymore and not to accept its verdict and aksed the court to not transgress constitutional limits.

Finally judiciary conceded and parliaments action was held legal.



In Narshimha Rao case --vote for cash -- although it was proved that the members took cash to vote but under article 105, nothing done in parliament can come under judicial scrutiny. Therefore they escaped and parliament ruled supreme.



Supreme Court AOR Examination – Leading Cases – I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1 | Tilak Marg

The 9th schedule came under judicial review The Bench held that all such laws included in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 would be tested individually on the touchstone of violation of fundamental rights or the basic structure doctrine. The laws would be examined separately by a three-judge Bench and if these were found to violate the fundamental rights, abridge or abrogate any of the rights or protection granted to the people would be set aside.

The Ninth Schedule (Article 31-B) was introduced by the former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to keep certain laws particularly those on land reforms beyond the scope of judicial review. Over the years 284 laws were included in it and about 30 of them are under challenge.

In its unanimous verdict, the Bench, while recognising the supremacy of the court to examine the validity of inclusion of a law in the Ninth Schedule, did not accept the argument that introduction of Article 31-B was just a one-time measure to protect agrarian laws after the abolition of the zamindari system and that it outlived its purpose. The Bench did not go into the question of validity of Article 31-B as it was not under challenge.

"The power to grant absolute immunity at will is not compatible with the basic structure doctrine and, therefore, after April 24, 1973 the laws included in the Ninth Schedule would not have absolute immunity. The validity of such laws can be challenged on the touchstone of basic structure such as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14 and Article 19, Article 15 and the principles underlying these Articles."

I never had the opportunity of reading Ram Jawaya Kapoor v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549, in law school. Recently, I had to look at it for one section of my book, and I realized how important this case is. It is actually a fairly brief judgment. Yet, it is an authority for at least three important propositions. First, our Constitution does not embody the full separation-of-powers doctrine, only a separation-of-functions principle. Second, despite what some scholars may tell you, our democracy embodies a parliamentary form of government. Third, the cabinet, formulates all important questions of foreign policy