9At the end of one of his poems, Kabir asks, "Who is it we have spent our whole lives loving?" Bhaktas--mystics--of all religions are seeking the answer to that question.
Montesquie - the tyranny of a prince in an oligarchy is not as dangerous to public welfare as the apathy of a citizen in a democracy.
article 32 read along with 142 empowers the court to issue directions to secure justice(vineet narain case)
majahab nahi sikhata aapas me bair karna
hindi hai hindustan hamaara
saare jahan se aacha hindustana
Further widening this penological schism is the Supreme Court’s dictum that the death penalty be applied only in the “rarest of rare cases.” In 1982, a bench of five judges, in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, upheld the constitutionality of Section 302 of the IPC, which prescribes the death penalty as punishment for murder. And in so upholding its validity, the court prescribed that the penalty be accorded only in the “rarest of rare cases.” The Court referenced Macaulay, who in drafting the code said capital punishment ought to be sparingly inflicted. But his intentions weren’t to instil in judges discretion in determining which were the “rarest of rare cases.” On the contrary, he was providing a rationale for why the death penalty was restricted only to murder and the highest offences against the state.
Justice Krishna Iyer’s concern, expressed in Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, that “… it is unfortunate that there are no penological guidelines in the statute for preferring the lesser sentence, it being left to ad-hoc forensic impressionism to decide for life or for death,” went unheeded in Bachan Singh. The “rarest of rare cases” doctrine has, on the other hand, exacerbated the confusion over which cases merit the death sentence. By its fundamental ethos, as Justice P.N. Bhagwati put it in his dissenting opinion, the doctrine is constitutionally flawed. “The question may well be asked,” wrote Bhagwati, “by the accused: Am I to live or die depending upon the way in which the Benches are constituted from time to time? Is that not clearly violative of the fundamental guarantees enshrined in Articles 14 and 21?”
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धीरे-धीरे रे मना, धीरे सब कुछ होय,
माली सींचे सौ घड़ा, ॠतु आए फल होय।
माली सींचे सौ घड़ा, ॠतु आए फल होय।
अर्थ : मन में धीरज रखने से सब कुछ होता है. अगर कोई माली किसी पेड़ को सौ घड़े पानी से सींचने लगे तब भी फल तो ऋतु आने पर ही लगेगा
“In a country well governed, poverty is something to be ashamed of. In a country badly governed, wealth is something to be ashamed’’. Confucius
mans capacity for justice makes democracy possible ; mans inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary -- democratic control on police (2nd ARC)“In a country well governed, poverty is something to be ashamed of. In a country badly governed, wealth is something to be ashamed’’. Confucius
Montesquie - the tyranny of a prince in an oligarchy is not as dangerous to public welfare as the apathy of a citizen in a democracy.
article 32 read along with 142 empowers the court to issue directions to secure justice(vineet narain case)
majahab nahi sikhata aapas me bair karna
hindi hai hindustan hamaara
saare jahan se aacha hindustana
Further widening this penological schism is the Supreme Court’s dictum that the death penalty be applied only in the “rarest of rare cases.” In 1982, a bench of five judges, in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, upheld the constitutionality of Section 302 of the IPC, which prescribes the death penalty as punishment for murder. And in so upholding its validity, the court prescribed that the penalty be accorded only in the “rarest of rare cases.” The Court referenced Macaulay, who in drafting the code said capital punishment ought to be sparingly inflicted. But his intentions weren’t to instil in judges discretion in determining which were the “rarest of rare cases.” On the contrary, he was providing a rationale for why the death penalty was restricted only to murder and the highest offences against the state.
Justice Krishna Iyer’s concern, expressed in Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, that “… it is unfortunate that there are no penological guidelines in the statute for preferring the lesser sentence, it being left to ad-hoc forensic impressionism to decide for life or for death,” went unheeded in Bachan Singh. The “rarest of rare cases” doctrine has, on the other hand, exacerbated the confusion over which cases merit the death sentence. By its fundamental ethos, as Justice P.N. Bhagwati put it in his dissenting opinion, the doctrine is constitutionally flawed. “The question may well be asked,” wrote Bhagwati, “by the accused: Am I to live or die depending upon the way in which the Benches are constituted from time to time? Is that not clearly violative of the fundamental guarantees enshrined in Articles 14 and 21?”
courts
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